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Saying “Yes”: How California’s Affirmative 
Consent Policy Can Transform Rape Culture 
Ruby Aliment* 
 
[I]f there is one area of social behavior where sexism is entrenched 
in law—one realm where traditional male prerogatives are most 
protected, male power most jealously preserved, and female power 
most jealously limited—it is in the area of sex itself, even forced 
sex.1 
—Susan Estrich, 1991 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Many criticize the recent spotlight on campus sexual assault rates as 
another example of the feminist movement emphasizing white feminist 
issues at the expense of more pervasive and wide-reaching problems.2 But 
this criticism fails to recognize that the focus on college sexual assault 
                                                                                                                     
*    J.D. candidate, Seattle University School of Law, 2016; B.A., University of Puget 
Sound, 2012. 
1 Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 814–15 (1991). 
2 Batya Ungar-Sargon, In 2014, the Campus Rape Debate Drowned Out More 
Important Feminist Issues, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 30, 2014), 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/120660/campus-rape-panic-why-feminists-chose-
wrong-issue-2014; see also Susan Dwyer, What a difference ‘yes’ makes for sex, AL 
JAZEERA AMERICA (Jan. 6, 2015), http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/1/campus-
sexual-assaultaffirmativeconsent.html. “In addition, affirmative consent is confined to 
institutions controlled by the U.S. Education Amendments’ Title IX, which protects 
people in educational programs that receive federal funding against discrimination on the 
basis of gender. For this reason, some suggest it may be an elitist standard that does 
nothing to protect women who are not in college.” Id.; see also Jon K. Brent, Lawmakers 
tackle sexual violence starting in high school, KION NEWS (Mar. 9, 2015), 
http://www.kionrightnow.com/news/local-news/lawmakers-tackle-sexual-violence-
starting-in-high-school/31706626 (“The new legislation would also require high school 
Health classes to discuss how to develop healthy relationships and include information 
about affirmative consent.”).  
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impacts the education of consent throughout the American public education 
system, and the resulting pressure can lead to the adoption of better 
policies. 3  The reformation of sexual misconduct policies on college 
campuses could transform our cultural attitudes towards consent, and an 
emphasis on education rather than incarceration presents an alternative 
method for increasing the safety of all individuals affected by sexual 
violence. 
Social science research estimates that one-in-four to one-in-five women 
will experience an attempted or completed sexual assault while in college.4 
Universities are known for their inaction or sub-par response to allegations 
of sexual assault and issues of non-consent, due in large part to the sheer 
number of alleged assaults that occur on them.5 In response, the federal 
government, through the Office of Civil Rights, published policy guidelines 
on Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 expressing its intent that 
Title IX cover sexual harassment and sexual assault. 6  Despite these 
explanations, 76 schools are currently under investigation for violating Title 
IX in the enforcement of their sexual assault and misconduct policies.7 
                                                                                                                     
3 See Patsy Takemoto Mink Equal Opportunity in Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §1681(a) 
(1972) (any education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance).  
4 CHRISTOPHER P. KREBS ET AL., THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, THE CAMPUS 
SEXUAL ASSAULT (CSA) STUDY xii (2007), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/221153.pdf. 
5 See Caroline Heldman, The Second Wave of Backlash Against Anti-Rape Activism, 
MS. MAGAZINE (Aug. 19, 2014), http://msmagazine.com/blog/2014/08/19/the-second-
wave-of-backlash-against-anti-rape-activism/. 
6 Grayson Sang Walker, The Evolution and Limits of Title IX Doctrine on Peer Sexual 
Assault, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 95, 102 (2010); see also U.S. Dep’t of Educ.’s 
Office for Civil Rights (OCR), Title IX and Sex Discrimination, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. 
(Apr. 29, 2015), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/tix_dis.html.  
7 Tyler Kingkade, 85 Colleges Are Now Under Federal Investigation for Sexual Assault 
Cases, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 15, 2014), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/15/colleges-federal-investigation-sexual-
assault_n_5990286.html; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ.’s Office for Civil 
Rights (OCR), U.S. Dep’t of Educ. Releases List of Higher Educ. Inst. with Open Title 
IX Sexual Violence Investigations (May 1, 2014), available at 
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This article argues that Title IX should go further in protecting students’ 
equal access to education and safety by mandating affirmative consent 
standards in the investigation of allegations. It should also mandate other 
survivor-centered policies that focus on education and bystander awareness. 
In this article, California's Senate Bill 967, often referred to as the "Yes 
Means Yes" Bill, is used as a case study to argue that the federal mandate of 
an affirmative consent policy, among other survivor-centered programming, 
is necessary to address the campus rape epidemic. An affirmative consent 
policy is a vital step in ameliorating the negative implications of contract 
theory and sexism in our cultural attitudes and legal standards towards 
sexual consent and female autonomy.8 
This paper begins with a brief history of consent, contract theory, and 
American rape law. Second, it describes the federal government’s attempts 
to address the problem. Third, it describes how universities respond, or fail 
to respond, to allegations of sexual assault in light of federal legislation. 
Fourth, I argue that California’s response is appropriately tailored to address 
non-consent on college campuses. Fifth, I argue that federal enforcement of 
a national policy is the best solution for making a difference. Finally, I 
illustrate how implementing an affirmative consent standard into pre-
existing Title IX requirements, specifically the lower standard of proof, will 
not infringe on the due process rights of the accused and presents the fairest 




8 This paper advocates for a change to Title IX, but specifically analyzes the change’s 
impact on institutions of higher education. Additionally, some academics have compared 
changing the policy around consent to laws mandating that people wear seatbelts, which 
suggests that policy can impact behavior and change our cultural attitudes. See Michael 
Catalini, More States Weigh a ‘Yes Means Yes’ College Policy, VNEWS.COM (Nov. 25, 
2014), http://www.vnews.com/news/state/region/14513534-95/more-states-weigh-a-yes-
means-yes-college-policy. 
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A. Use of Language 
 Although women are the primary victims of sexual violence,9 people still 
criticize the feminist movement for over-victimizing women10 In discussing 
the campus rape epidemic, any attempt to de-gender the conversation would 
be misleading, as college women experience sexual assault at much higher 
rates than men, and most often at the hands of men11 The heteronormativity 
implicated by the campus rape epidemic has two points of significance: 
first, it illustrates the gendered dynamic of consent (where women’s consent 
is suspect under the law, privileging men’s sexuality and power), and 
second, it shows how our gendered assumptions result in a failure to 
properly address and find solutions for sexual assault by stereotyping male 
and female sexual behavior in campus adjudicatory hearings (e.g., the 
common narratives that boys will be boys and she asked for it). 
Therefore, throughout this paper, I use female gender pronouns to refer to 
individuals making sexual assault accusations and male gender pronouns for 
those accused of sexual assault. I recognize that women often perpetrate 
sexual assault against men, but, in most cases, college men are raped by 
other men. 12  Furthermore, since so few men report, there is very little 
                                                                                                                     
9 KREBS ET AL, supra note 4, at viii; see also Victims and Perpetrators, NAT’L INST. OF 
JUST. (Oct. 26, 2010), available at http://www.nij.gov/topics/crime/rape-sexual-
violence/Pages/victims-perpetrators.aspx. 
10 Cathy Young, Stop Fem-Splaining: What ‘Women Against Feminism’ Gets Right, 
TIME MAGAZINE (July 24, 2014), http://time.com/3028827/women-against-feminism-
gets-it-right/. 
11 Victims and Perpetrators, supra note 9; RANA SAMPSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE: 
OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERV., ACQUAINTANCE RAPE OF COLLEGE 
STUDENTS 3 (2002), available at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/e03021472.pdf (“Ninety 
percent of college women who are victims of rape or attempted rape know their assailant. 
The attacker is usually a classmate, friend, boyfriend, ex-boyfriend, or other acquaintance 
(in that order).”).   
12 See id. “College men who are raped are usually raped by other men. However, since 
so few men report, information is limited about the extent of the problem.” Id. National 
criminal justice statistics reveal that of all adults/juveniles who come to the attention of 
authorities for sex crimes, females account for less than 10% of the cases. See also 
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reliable information available to describe the problem.13 This paper relies on 
available information, and therefore, de-gendering the accused and accuser 
would not adequately describe the statistics or responses to those statistics. 
Next, the victim versus survivor distinction is unquestionably political.14 
The linguistic shift from victim to survivor, in many ways, better describes 
the experience of those who have experienced sexual assault by challenging 
the victimization of women and recognizing the strength required for many 
to live after a sexual assault. Therefore, those accused of sexual assault will 
be referred to as the perpetrator, the accused, or the alleged rapist 
(depending on the determination of the accusation), and the accuser will be 
referred to as the complainant or survivor, unless specific information 
indicates how a particular individual describes herself following a sexual 
assault.  
Finally, I use the terms “rape” and “sexual assault” interchangeably to 
refer to nonconsensual sexual contact and intercourse.15 
                                                                                                                     
CENTER FOR SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FEMALE SEX 
OFFENDERS 1 (2007), available at 
http://www.csom.org/pubs/female_sex_offenders_brief.pdf. 
13 Id. 
14 E.g., Hannah Groch-Begley, A Guide To George Will’s Decades Of Attacks On Sexual 
Assault Victims & “Rape Crisis Feminists,” MEDIA MATTERS FOR AM. (Oct. 15, 2014), 
http://mediamatters.org/research/2014/10/15/a-guide-to-george-wills-decades-of-attacks-
on-s/201166 (A prominent American journalist and author criticized “what he called the 
‘victimization sweepstakes,’ in which ‘many prizes, including media attention and 
therapeutic preferences from government, go to those who succeed at being seen as 
vulnerable and suffering,’ specifically for experiencing rape on college campuses.”).  
15 Side note: I do not address the fear of false rape reports because no reliable data exists 
to suggest that false rape reports occur at any level higher than the false reports of other 
crimes, such as burglary and homicide. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reports 
that unfounded rape reports account for eight percent of total reported rapes; however, 
this number fails to control for the various conditions that encourage individuals to 
rescind their accusations, such as a person’s intimate relationship with the accused, the 
lack of physical evidence, victim blaming, and police bias. Additionally, new research 
has shown that many of these statistics mischaracterized unfounded charges as false 
reports when they really described those cases for which the police declined to 
recommend prosecution. See SAMPSON, supra note 11, at 5; see also Nicholas J. Little, 
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II. CONSENT, CONTRACT THEORY, AND RAPE LAW 
Why do you consult their words when it is not their mouths that 
speak? . . . The lips always say “no,” and rightly so; but the tone is 
not always the same, and that cannot lie. . . . Must her 
modesty condemn her to misery? 16 
—Jean-Jacque Rousseau, 1911 
The above quote from Rousseau describes his personal misogynistic 
attitudes towards female sexual autonomy, in addition to a commonplace 
romantic ideal whereby notions of modesty encourage women to play hard 
to get.17 John Locke and Thomas Hobbes, two other great political theorists, 
shared similar positions on female consent and romance, and all three are 
credited, in large part, with the foundation of much of American (referring 
to the United States of America) political thought.18 In summarizing the 
development of American political thought, Mustafa T. Kasubhai wrote, “If 
this is the type of consent society has accorded women throughout history, 
it is not surprising that rape law has developed requiring resistance and 
force, rather than actual non-consent of the victim.”19 These trends inform 
                                                                                                                     
From No Means No to Only Yes Means Yes: The Rational Results of an Affirmative 
Consent Standard in Rape Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1321, 1330–31 (2005). “Those who 
suggest that women are prone to false accusations of rape, and who thus oppose any 
liberalization of the requirements to establish a case of rape, have failed to demonstrate 
why the numbers do not bear out such a suggestion. They also have not shown why 
women might be more prone to invent charges of rape then men might be to unjustly 
accuse people of other crimes (which do not carry the same evidentiary requirements) 
. . .What is also well documented is the fact that false accusations of rape are no more 
prevalent than false accusations of other types of major crime.” Id.; see also Beverly J. 
Ross, Does Diversity in Legal Scholarship Make A Difference?: A Look at the Law of 
Rape, 100 DICK. L. REV. 795, 812 (1996). 
16 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, EMILE, 332 (Barbara Foxley trans., 1911).  
17 See Maureen Dowd, What’s a Modern Girl to Do?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Oct. 30, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/30/magazine/whats-a-modern-girl-to-do.html?_r=0.  
18 See Mustafa T. Kasubhai, Destabilizing Power in Rape: Why Consent Theory in Rape 
Law Is Turned on Its Head, 11 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 37, 49 (1996). 
19 Id. 
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our understanding of women’s ability to consent, which complicates the 
adjudication of rape accusations.  
Throughout American legal history, women’s consent has been suspect 
and discredited. For example, in Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, decided in 
1994, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied recourse to a complainant 
after finding that her story was insufficient to establish the “forcible 
compulsion” element necessary to support a rape conviction.20 The court 
reasoned that because the defendant did not physically restrain the 
complainant, except through his body weight, and the complainant never 
attempted to leave the room, when “the record clearly demonstrate[d] that 
the door could be unlocked easily from the inside,” her testimony was 
devoid of any evidence of force, even though she said “no” throughout the 
encounter.21 Existing case law dictated that when the record does not show 
evidence of physical force or psychological coercion, the forcible 
compulsion requirement could not be met.22 
Brown v. State, decided in 1906, used similar reasoning. The Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin reversed the conviction and sentencing of a man 
accused of raping a 14-year-old girl.23 The complainant in the case testified 
that the defendant approached her in a field on her way to a family 
member’s home, tripped her to the ground, removed her clothing, and had 
intercourse with her.24 During the act, the complainant screamed as loud as 
she could and struggled to get up, but the defendant covered her mouth.25 
On these facts, the court found that the complainant’s testimony did not 
                                                                                                                     
20 Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161, 1166 (Pa. 1994). 
21 Id. at 1164. 
22 Id.  
23 Brown v. State, 106 N.W. 536, 541 (Wis. 1906). 
24 Id. at 537. 
25 Id.  
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adequately demonstrate that the sexual act was against her will.26 The court 
held that  
not only must there be an entire absence of mental consent or 
assent, but there must be the most vehement exercise of every 
physical means or faculty within the woman’s power to resist the 
penetration of her person, and this must be shown to persist until 
the offense is consummated.27 
Given the facts, it is difficult to imagine what the complainant could have 
done differently to demonstrate non-consent. 
Both cases, though separated by almost 100 years, do not rely on unusual 
legal standards. In fact, the American Law Institute’s revision of the Model 
Penal Code adopts the attitude that a rape charge should not depend on a 
woman’s lack of consent, but on the attacker’s use of force.28 
These attitudes towards consent created an uncodified, though frequently 
followed, “reasonable victim” standard for evaluating the complainant’s 
behavior.29  Many courts require women to display the maximum amount of 
resistance, regardless of the evidence that “rape victims who attempt 
physical resistance to sexual attacks are significantly more likely to be 
injured than those who do not.”30 This standard assumes that all women 
who experience sexual violence communicate their non-consent in the same 
way—specifically in the way men are expected to communicate it. This 
male victim model is  
best known to the male judges and lawyers who formulated it, but 
not a model appropriate for a class of victims almost entirely 
                                                                                                                     
26 Id. at 540–41. 
27 Id. at 538.  
28 Kasubhai, supra note 18, at 55–56; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (1980). A 
definition of rape should focus “upon objective manifestations of aggression by the actor. 
Accordingly, the offense is defined to occur when the actor ‘compels’ the victim ‘to 
submit by force or by threat.” Id. 
29 Ross, supra note 15, at 819. 
30 Id. at 817. 
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female. . . . This is a standard developed by men from the 
perspective of men and then imposed on [women] without regard 
to whether most women actually conform to the standard. 31  
If these assumptions were accurate, our rape laws and attitudes toward 
consent would have contributed to the decline of sexual assault. 
Our cultural acceptance of utmost resistance as the necessary indicator of 
non-consent obscures our understanding of consent and rape, creating a 
particularly dangerous environment for women. For example, in a recent 
study published by Violence & Gender, researchers found that, when 
behaviorally-descriptive questions are posed to heterosexual men (e.g., 
“Have you ever coerced somebody to intercourse by holding them down?”) 
versus questions using targeted labels (e.g., “Have you ever raped 
somebody?”), men will admit to exercising sexually coercive behaviors, 
including using some force to obtain intercourse, but they will deny ever 
raping a woman.32 
Cynthia Ann Wicktom reports in her paper, Focusing on the Offender’s 
Forceful Conduct: A Proposal for the Redefinition of Rape Laws, that rape 
law traditionally focused on the survivor’s non-consent to determine 
whether rape occurred.33 Therefore, without evidence of forceful conduct 
and overt non-consent, silence operates as consent.34 Many people fail to 
                                                                                                                     
31 Id. at 819. 
32 Sarah R. Edwards et al., Denying Rape but Endorsing Forceful Intercourse: Exploring 
Differences Among Responders, 1 VIOLENCE & GENDER 188, 188–93 (2014), available 
at http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/pdf/10.1089/vio.2014.0022. 
33 Cynthia Ann Wicktom, Focusing on the Offender’s Forceful Conduct: A Proposal for 
the Redefinition of Rape Laws, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 399, 402 (1988). 
34 Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69 (1981). Under the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, there are two exceptional instances where silence is 
interpreted as acceptance: first, those where the offered silently takes the offered benefits, 
and second, those where one party has given the other party reason to interpret silence or 
inaction as asset, sometimes based on prior dealings between the parties. Critics of 
affirmative consent policies say the standard causes sexual interaction to look more like 
contractual engagements (i.e., Can I touch you here? Yes. Can I kiss you there? Yes); 
however, legal contractual standards parallel American rape law more than California’s 
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realize that this conceptualization of consent and resistance in rape law is 
largely informed by a distinctly male point of view—to the exclusion of the 
female experience.35 
Our prevailing conception of consent (i.e., no means no), which requires 
force and overt non-consent, presumes that both social actors enter into the 
sexual contract as equals.  
[C]ritics . . . have attacked the claim that, if two individuals make a 
contract, the fact that the contract has been made is sufficient to 
show that the exchange must be equal. The critics point out that, 
[sic] if one party is in an inferior position . . . then he or she has no 
choice but to agree to the disadvantageous terms offered by the 
superior party.36  
Some feminist critics have even gone as far as to say that, within our current 
construct of female consent within a patriarchal society, women can never 
truly consent to sex.37 Considered radical by some, this position illustrates 
the need to seriously consider how women are disadvantaged by the 
prevailing consent standards. 
In her book Date Rape: Feminism, Philosophy, and The Law, Lois 
Pineau writes that “because the prevailing ideology has so much informed 
our conceptualization of sexual interaction, it is extraordinarily difficult for 
us to distinguish between assault and seduction, submission and enjoyment, 
                                                                                                                     
new policy, as evidenced by the Restatement’s position on silence. A consent standard 
wherein a participant can infer consent from silence or from the failure to explicitly deny 
consent is much more like a contractual engagement than a situation where consent is 
communicated with enthusiasm and willingness. Id. 
35 Ross, supra note 15, at 814. 
36 CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 57–58 (1988). 
37 See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 28 (1993). MacKinnon never 
explicitly draws this connection, but her work has been interpreted to mean that women 
cannot give true consent under the existing conditions of gender inequality. Id; see also 
ANDREA DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE xxxiii (Basic Books 1997). “‘I like it’ is the standard 
for citizenship, and ‘I want it’ pretty much exhausts the First Amendment’s meaning for 
women.” Id. 
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or so we imagine.”38 The ubiquity of male sexual dominance with romance 
contributes to a sexual environment that is not easily navigable for any 
sexual participant. 
Overall, our culture has relied on consent standards that disserve sexual 
participants in two ways: first, these standards presume both partners are 
able to freely express their non-consent, and second, they infer that 
women’s lack of consent does not mean no. The codification of this 
dynamic should be the one receiving backlash, as it fails to create an 
equitable sexual atmosphere for any party. 
Perhaps in reaction to the law’s failure to recognize women’s lack of 
consent in determining whether a rape has occurred, feminist activists have 
promulgated the standard of “No Means No,” which has been popular on 
college campuses, though it has not been effective. 39  Fraternities, in 
particular, have ridiculed the standard, and sexual assault rates have been 
largely stagnant despite its use. 40  Despite the mantra’s seeming failure, 
college campuses host a significant amount of activism against sexual 
assault.41 
                                                                                                                     
38 LOIS PINEAU, DATE RAPE: FEMINISM, PHILOSOPHY, AND THE LAW 6 (Leslie Francis 
ed. 1996). 
39 Erin Anderssen, Sex on campus: How No Means No became Yes Means Yes, THE 
GLOBE AND MAIL (Nov. 14, 2014), 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/life/relationships/sex-on-campus-how-no-means-no-
became-yes-means-yes/article21598708/; see also Jed Rubenfeld, Mishandling Rape, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/16/opinion/sunday/mishandling-
rape.html?ref=opinion&_r=1. 
40 See Rebecca Rose, Texas Tech Fraternity Stripped of Charter For ‘No Means Yes’ 
Sign, JEZEBEL (Oct. 7, 2014), http://jezebel.com/texas-tech-fraternity-stripped-of-charter-
for-no-means-1643654682; see also Lindsay Beyerstein, “No Means Yes, Yes Means 
Anal” Frat Banned From Yale, THE BIG THINK (May 18, 2011), 
http://bigthink.com/focal-point/no-means-yes-yes-means-anal-frat-banned-from-yale. 
41 See generally End Rape on Campus, EROC, http://endrapeoncampus.org/ (last visited 
Oct. 15, 2015); see generally, KNOW YOUR IX, http://knowyourix.org/ (last visited Oct. 
15, 2015). 
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III. CURRENT FEDERAL RESPONSES 
In 1990, Congress “acted to ensure that institutions of higher education 
[had] strategies to prevent and respond to sexual assault on campus and to 
provide students and their parents accurate information about campus 
crime.” 42  The two major federal laws dealing with sexual violence in 
education are The Clery Act and Title IX.43 The Clery Act requires schools 
to disclose information about crime, specifically sexual assault, on 
campus.44 Title IX, as monitored by The Office for Civil Rights (OCR), is a 
prohibition against sex-based discrimination in education that has been 
clarified by OCR through “Dear Colleague Letters” and other guidance to 
implicate sexual violence, though it is best known for mandating equal 
rights within athletic programs.45 
Title IX reads that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of 
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity 
receiving federal financial assistance.” 46  The statute expressly prohibits 
exclusion from participation in any educational program or activity and the 
denial of the benefits of those programs and activities.47 It also requires that 
no student be subject to discrimination under any education program or 
                                                                                                                     
42 HEATHER M. KARJANE ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, SEXUAL ASSAULT ON 
CAMPUS: WHAT COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES ARE DOING ABOUT IT 1 (2005), 
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/205521.pdf. 
43 Jeanne Clery Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1092 (1990); Patsy Takemoto Mink Equal Opportunity 
in Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1972). 
44 Jeanne Clery Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1092 (1990); see also KARJANE ET AL., supra note 42. 
45 Patsy Takemoto Mink Equal Opportunity in Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1972); 
see also Paul M. Anderson, Title IX at Forty: An Introduction and Historical Review of 
Forty Legal Developments That Shaped Gender Equity Law, 22 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 
325, 333 (2012). 
46 Patsy Takemoto Mink Equal Opportunity in Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) 
(1972). 
47 Id. 
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activity 48 —a piece of the legislation that can be used to ensure equal 
treatment of all genders in sexual misconduct investigations and hearings. 
The OCR monitors Title IX enforcement using the publication of “Dear 
Colleague Letters,” which act as significant guidance documents to assist 
administrators in meeting their obligations by informing recipients about 
how OCR evaluates compliance.49 Plus, the documents provide the public 
with information about their rights and the regulations OCR enforces.50  
 Title IX’s broad language necessitates these letters to clarify that sexual 
assault and harassment are examples of the sort of disparate treatment 
experienced based on gender that triggers certain responses under Title 
IX.51 To ensure notice to institutions receiving federal funding, OCR sends 
these documents to the Title IX coordinator of each participating school or 
institution and makes them available online through its website.52 
The letters define sexual violence and schools’ responsibility to respond 
to violence under Title IX.53 The letters define sexual violence as “physical 
sexual acts perpetuated against a person’s will or where a person is 
incapable of giving consent due to the victim’s use of drugs or alcohol.”54 
Some of the listed responsibilities include the prompt, impartial, and 
thorough investigations following a complaint; the commitment that the 
institution keeps the complainant’s identity confidential when appropriate; 
and the suspension of mediation as a remedy in sexual assault 
proceedings.55 The letters make clear that if a school “knows or reasonably 
                                                                                                                     
48 Id. 
49 RUSSLYNN ALI, ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR C.R. (OCR), U. S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DEAR 
COLLEAGUE: SEXUAL VIOLENCE 1, n. 1 (2011), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/dear_colleague_sexual_violence.pdf. 
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should know about student-on-student harassment that creates a hostile 
environment, Title IX requires the school to take immediate action to 
eliminate the harassment, prevent its recurrence, and address its effects.”56 
Schools must also (1) distribute a notice of nondiscrimination to students, 
parents, employees, and even applicants; (2) adopt public grievance 
procedures providing for prompt and equitable resolution of student and 
employee sex discrimination complaints; and (3) designate one employee 
the responsibilities of coordinating Title IX complaint procedures and 
addressing patterns of “systemic problems that arise during the review of 
complaints.”57 
The mandate that schools determine responsibility using a preponderance 
of the evidence standard was the most controversial and criticized 
clarification of the recent Dear Colleague Letter. OCR adopted this standard 
because “the Supreme Court has applied [it] in civil litigation involving 
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,” and it is the 
standard OCR uses when investigating Title IX complaints against 
recipients of federal education funds. 58  Despite these mandates, sexual 
assault remains an immense threat on college campuses, which suggests 
schools are not doing enough on their own to protect their students. 
IV. THE STATE OF THE COLLEGE RAPE EPIDEMIC 
“We have forgotten that before we began calling this date rape and 
date fraud, we called it exciting.” 59 
— Warren Farrell, men’s rights activist, author of The Myth of 
Male Power 
                                                                                                                     
56 Id.  
57 Id. at 6–7. 
58 Id. at 10. 
59 WARREN FARRELL, THE MYTH OF MALE POWER 314–15 (1993). 
Saying “Yes” 201 
VOLUME 14 • ISSUE 1 • 2015 
Many reject the commonly-cited statistic that one-in-four or one-in-five 
women will experience an attempted or completed sexual assault while in 
college, in part because so many women choose not to view what happened 
to them as rape and the population at large refuses to believe men are 
committing so much rape. 60  However, statistics show that, in a given 
academic year, three percent of college women experience an attempted or 
completed sexual assault.61 When projected over a typical college career, 
researchers estimate that one-in-five women experience sexual assault 
during college.62 These statistics do not mean to suggest that one-fifth of 
women believe they have been raped; rather, they are based on studies of 
unreported rape, which indicate that six to 15 percent of men report acts that 
meet the legal definitions of rape or attempted rape.63 
Dr. David Lisak, in his study, “Repeat Rape and Multiple Offending 
Among Undetected Rapists,” reports that almost two-thirds of the men 
whose reported acts met the legal definition of rape raped more than once.64 
These repeat rapists each committed an average of six rapes and/or 
attempted rapes while in college.65 In fact, Lisak estimates that three percent 
of college men are responsible for more than 90 percent of the rapes.66 
                                                                                                                     
60 See Jake New, One in Five? INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (Dec. 15, 2014), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/12/15/critics-advocates-doubt-oft-cited-
campus-sexual-assault-statistic. 
61 KARJANE ET AL, supra note 42, at 2. 
62 Id. 
63 David Lisak et al., Repeat Rape and Multiple Offending Among Undetected Rapists, 
14 VIOLENCE AND VICTIMS 73, 73 (2002). 
64 Id. at 80. 
65 Id.; but see SAMPSON, supra note 11, at 11; letter from Scott Berkowitz & Rebecca 
O’Connor, Rape, Abuse & Incest National Network (RAINN), to the White House Task 
Force to Protect Students from Sexual Assault (Feb. 28, 2014), available at 
https://rainn.org/images/03-2014/WH-Task-Force-RAINN-Recommendations.pdf. 
66 Id. 
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Additionally, other research shows that, within the context of college rape, 
the vast majority of survivors and perpetrators knew one another.67 
Despite this problem, a national survey of 440 institutions of higher 
education found that 40 percent of US colleges and universities have not 
conducted a sexual assault investigation in five years, 21 percent of 
campuses do not provide training on sexual violence to all faculty and staff, 
and 31 percent do not provide any training to students on sexual assault 
prevention or the available resources.68 Our cultural willingness to doubt 
complainants, especially when a man’s reputation is on the line, promotes 
this failure.  
A. University Responses or Lack Thereof 
Emma Sulkowicz, a Columbia University student, became a symbol of 
the movement against college adjudicatory procedures in 2014 after she 
began carrying her mattress around campus in a brave public protest 
following the sexual misconduct hearing of her alleged rapist—a man she 
knew and had a previous sexual relationship with.69 Sulkowicz, along with 
23 Columbia and Barnard students, filed a Title IX complaint alleging the 
schools mishandled her sexual assault case.70 Sulkowicz did not decide to 
come forward with her allegation until she met two other women her 
alleged rapist assaulted under similar circumstances.71 
                                                                                                                     
67 Dana Berliner, Rethinking the Reasonable Belief Defense to Rape, 100 YALE L.J. 
2687, 2687 (1991); Victims and Perpetrators, supra note 9. 
68 U.S. SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL AND CONTRACTING OVERSIGHT—
MAJORITY STAFF, SEXUAL VIOLENCE ON CAMPUS: HOW TOO MANY INSTITUTIONS OF 
HIGHER EDUCATION ARE FAILING TO PROTECT STUDENTS 1 (2014), available at 
http://www.mccaskill.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SurveyReportwithAppendix.pdf. 
69 Vanessa Grigoriadis, Meet the College Women Who Are Starting a Revolution Against 
Campus Sexual Assault, N. Y. MAG. (Sept. 21, 2014), 
http://nymag.com/thecut/2014/09/emma-sulkowicz-campus-sexual-assault-activism.html. 
70 Emma Sulkowicz, My Rapist Is Still on Campus, TIME MAG. (May 15, 2014), 
http://time.com/99780/campus-sexual-assault-emma-sulkowicz/. 
71 Id. 
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During Sulkowicz’s hearing, rather than focus on when consent was 
given and received, the committee hearing members were fixated on how it 
was possible to be anally raped without lubricant.72 In all three women’s 
hearings, the same alleged rapist was found not responsible by a 
preponderance of the evidence.73 Outcomes like Sulkowicz’s contribute to 
an environment that excuses sexual assault and discourages survivors from 
coming forward. 
Universities have ample research on the factors that inhibit their students 
from reporting sexual assault. These factors include their own campus 
policies on drug and alcohol; required participation in campus adjudicatory 
hearings; and unintentional victim blaming through the over emphasis of 
the complainant’s responsibility to avoid sexual assault, stigma, trauma, and 
psychological distress.74 Partnered with all these factors is the hesitancy to 
recognize these acts of violence as reportable acts of violence.75 
At most universities, administers deal with reports of sexual assault 
through no-contact orders or other binding administrative actions.76 Other 
outcomes include expulsion, suspension, probation, censure, restitution, and 
the loss of privileges—such as the ability to participate in campus 
activities.77 But the guidelines for imposing such outcomes vary widely. 
Only a quarter of universities engage in information-gathering or 
investigative processes, and due process for the accused is guaranteed by 




74 KARJANE ET AL., supra note 42, at 8–9. 
75 Was I Raped?, RAPE, ABUSE & INCEST NATIONAL NETWORK (RAINN), 
https://rainn.org/get-information/types-of-sexual-assault/was-it-rape (last visited Feb. 9, 
2015). 
76 KARJANE ET AL., supra note 42, at 10–11. 
77 Id. 
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Critics of campus adjudicatory hearings, including the Supreme Court of 
the United States, argue that campuses’ ability to expel students—depriving 
them of property and liberty interests guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment—creates pressing due process concerns. 79 However, studies 
show that colleges rarely expel the men found “responsible” for sexual 
assault; 80  meanwhile, survivors often drop out of school following 
inadequate responses to their allegations and have no case law or 
guaranteed due process rights to fall back on.81 
V. CALIFORNIA’S SENATE BILL 967 AND BACKLASH AGAINST TITLE 
IX ENFORCEMENT 
Senate Bill 967 was added to California’s Education Code in 2014, and it 
states that “in order to receive state funds for student financial assistance, 
[schools] shall adopt” an affirmative consent standard “in the determination 
of whether consent was given by both parties to sexual activity” (emphasis 
added).82 
A. California’s Response 
The bill defines affirmative consent as affirmative, conscious, and 
voluntary.83 The legislation designates the responsibility of ensuring the 
receipt of affirmative consent to all participants of sexual activities.84 This 
                                                                                                                     
79 Elizabeth Bartholet et al., Rethinking Harvard’s sexual harassment policy. THE BOS. 
GLOBE (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/10/14/rethink-
harvard-sexual-harassment-policy/HFDDiZN7nU2UwuUuWMnqbM/story.html. 
80 Kristen Lombarth, A Lack of Consequences for Sexual Assault, CTR. FOR PUBLIC 
INTEGRITY (Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2010/02/24/4360/lack-
consequences-sexual-assault-0. 
81 See SAMPSON, supra note 11, at 8. 
82 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67386 (2015).  
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
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consent cannot be inferred through the existence of a sexual relationship, 
silence, lack of protest or resistance, and it can be revoked at any time.85 
During disciplinary evaluations, the accused will not be excused for 
mistakenly believing the complainant consented because of intoxication, 
recklessness, or under circumstances where the accused knew or should 
have known the complainant was unable to consent.86 All complaints will 
be evaluated using a preponderance of the evidence standard.87 
These standards and policies—including the rights and responsibilities 
for students under the policy—will be made available for students and 
addressed during incoming student orientation. 88  The outreach and 
educational components of the bill seek to ensure that students will not be 
surprised to learn during investigations that the question will not be “When 
did you say ‘no’?” but rather “When did you say ‘yes’?” and “When did 
you hear ‘yes’ from your partner?” The bill places more restrictions and 
responsibilities onto schools, ensuring greater compliance with Title IX.89 
B. Criticisms 
In an article titled “Campus Rape: The Problem with ‘Yes Means Yes,’” 
Cathy Young wrote that the bill’s effect “will be to codify vague and 
capricious rules governing student conduct, to shift the burden to (usually 
male) students accused of sexual offenses, and to create a disturbing 
precedent for government regulation of consensual sex.” 90  Young’s 
concerns seem to be based largely on what she sees as enforcing an unfair 







90 Cathy Young, Campus Rape: The Problem With ‘Yes Means Yes, TIME MAG. (Aug. 
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Batya Ungar-Sargon attacks the legislation for defining silence as non-
consent in her piece titled, “‘Affirmative Consent’ Is Bad for Women: 
California’s new campus rape law only codifies a troubling double 
standard.” 91  Ungar-Sargon worries that the legislation immediately 
redefined millions of consensual sex acts as rape.92 
Since California adopted SB 967, other states and universities 
implemented similar language requiring affirmative consent, intended to 
keep them in adherence with Title IX’s responsibilities. 93  These 
developments amplified the opposition, as more and more young men are 
believed to be in danger of false accusations and wrongful findings of 
responsibility. Harvard University law professors have been some of the 
loudest opponents to the change. They argue that these changes give greater 
power and governance to institutions that are not suited to adjudicate 
crimes, like sexual assault, in the first place.94 
Other concerns look to the impact that culture can have on the ways 
individuals express consent. Janet Halley, writing for Harvard Law Review, 
worries that adjudicators’ own experiences and biases will determine how 
they view proper expressions of consent, leading to potentially classist 
outcomes.95 To illustrate her point, Halley describes the facts of State v. 
                                                                                                                     
91 Ungar-Sargon, supra note 2. 
92 Id. 
93 Mileka Lincoln, UH considering ‘Yes Means yes’ consent policy to strengthen Title IX 
requirements, HAW. NEWS NOW (Jan. 23, 2015), 
http://www.hawaiinewsnow.com/story/27929490/uh-considering-yes-means-yes-consent-
policy-to-strengthen-title-ix-requirements; see also Mike Vilensky, Gov. Cuomo Plans 
‘Yes Means Yes’ Policy for Sexual Interactions at College Campuses, THE WALL ST. J. 
(Jan. 17, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/governor-andrew-cuomo-plans-yes-means-
yes-policy-at-college-campuses-statewide-1421529943. 
94 Bartholet, supra note 79. 
95 Janet Halley, Trading the Megaphone for the Gavel in Title IX Enforcement: Backing 
off the hype of Title IX enforcement, 128 HARV. L. REV. 103 (2015), available at 
http://harvardlawreview.org/2015/02/trading-the-megaphone-for-the-gavel-in-title-ix-
enforcement/.  
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Rusk, where the white, middle-class female complainant brought charges 
against a low-income white male defendant with an inner-city 
background.96 The complainant testified that the accused coerced her into 
sex by taking her keys and choking her. 97  Halley questions these 
expressions of coercion and asks, “is entirely subjective evidence of threat 
of force sufficient to establish guilt?” These sorts of ambiguities support the 
argument that Title IX enforcement procedures are inherently indifferent to 
“race, class, and other key differences” that may impact fair 
determinations.98 
Halley’s other concern is that, in “hook-up culture,” all genders are 
consuming copious amounts of drugs and alcohol, but policies addressing 
consent and intoxication inherently privilege the female participant at the 
expense of the male.99 She describes a sexual encounter where both the 
woman and the man are voluntarily drunk during the encounter and then 
afterwards feel “intense remorse and moral horror” leading them both to 
turn to the Title IX office with complaints.100 She asks, “which of them gets 
the benefit of the per se imputation of unwelcomeness, and which of them 
carries the heavy handicap of no mitigation?”101 Her worry, of course, is 
that institutions implement these policies to the detriment of men. 
Halley’s concerns are valid; however, they imply colleges are not fit to 
adjudicate sex crimes since it is the responsibility of the criminal justice 
system. Those at The Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE) 
agree and argue, “Improving police response to sexual crimes is the only 
                                                                                                                     
96 Id.; see also State v. Rusk, 424 A.2d 720, 721 (Md. 1981).  
97 Rusk, 424 A.2d at 721.  
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way to help victims universally.”102 Similarly, an open letter from the Rape, 
Incest, and Abuse National Network (RAINN) to The White House reads, 
“It would never occur to anyone to leave the adjudication of a murder in the 
hands of a school’s internal judicial process. Why, then, is it not only 
common, but expected, for them to do so when it comes to sexual 
assault?” 103  These criticisms presume that our criminal justice system 
provides the proper solution. 
Reliance on the criminal justice system requires that we ask ourselves 
whether incarceration works and what it would take to remove the biases 
identified by Halley, regarding race and class, from criminal adjudications. 
An exploration of that question is out of the scope of this paper, but 
considering the wide-based failure of the criminal justice system and its 
major disproportionate impact on people of color and low-income 
individuals, it hardly seems like a well-thought-out solution. Additionally, 
increasing police intervention ignores the fact that most assaults on college 
campuses occur without witnesses and physical evidence, making it 
extremely unlikely that any prosecutor would pursue the claims. 
VI. WHY FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT IS THE BEST OPTION 
A. The Benefits of a Universal Federal Policy 
Mandating affirmative consent standards through Title IX “Dear 
Colleague Letters” is the best way to ensure a universal response to campus 
sexual assault because it sets a clear standard for all recipients of federal 
education money. Through these clarifying letters, the federal government 
has “an unprecedented platform to deliver a national message of zero 
                                                                                                                     
102 Robert Shibley, Time to Call the Cops: Title IX Has Failed Campus Sexual Assault, 
TIME MAG. (Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.thefire.org/time-call-cops-title-ix-failed-campus-
sexual-assault/. 
103 Letter from Scott Berkowitz & Rebecca O’Connor, supra note 65. 
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tolerance for sexual violence on college campuses.”104  Data on campus 
sexual assault and the sheer number of Title IX investigations shows that 
states are not taking action on their own to address issues of non-consent 
and are only passively trying to adhere to Title IX’s obligations. Federal 
enforcement is the only way to ensure universal equal rights on all college 
campuses. 
Next, much of the backlash against affirmative consent standards 
suggests a certain amount of anxiety resulting from what critics see as an 
ambiguous standard subject to misinterpretation and accidental rape. This 
anxiety is the best argument for the institution of a national standard 
because universalizing investigative procedures will reduce ambiguity in 
sexual communication. OCR could mandate affirmative consent policies in 
the same way that it enforced a universal adoption of the preponderance of 
the evidence standard. 
Currently, the policy guidelines around consent “leave schools with wide 
latitude in developing and implementing grievance procedures. Having 
promulgated a flexible compliance standard, OCR naturally investigates the 
worst actors and rarely examines ineffective, but non-egregious, sexual 
harassment policies.” 105  A stricter standard on consent would give the 
federal government greater enforcement power, which is beneficial—
despite federalist concerns—because the existing framework puts the 
burden on individual litigants to ensure schools resolve complaints 
properly,106  and this dynamic contributes to a legal system that is only 
available to those with the means to afford it. 
Additionally, a national standard is most likely to result in a paradigm 
shift regarding consent in general, outside of adjudicative and criminal 
proceedings. California SB 967 is a great example of how the federal 
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government can clarify Title IX requirements to better respond to the 
campus rape epidemic. 
Finally, many have criticized California since the promulgation of SB 
967 for seeking to legislate sexuality by mandating that sexual partners 
adopt a specific style of consent.107 However, consent is both a legal and a 
sexual policy, given the fact that the lack of consent is what distinguishes 
sexual conduct from sexual assault. For these reasons, the law can help 
address sexual assault because it applies uniformly, has standards of review, 
and proscribes normative behavior to ensure that individuals know when 
they are breaking the law. Furthermore, sexual assault is a criminal act and 
should be addressed by the law to illustrate the seriousness of a sexual 
assault violation. 
B. A Better Alternative to the Criminal Justice System 
Although sexual assault is a criminal act, SB 967 does not advocate for a 
greater intervention from the criminal justice system. In fact, the statute 
prescribes standards for university misconduct proceedings that distinguish 
it from the court of law in an intentional and beneficial way. Though many 
people argue that a university is not the place to determine quasi-criminal 
liability, deferring to the criminal justice system only serves to promote a 
different kind of violence and injustice. Currently, the United States has the 
largest incarcerated population in the world, with over 2.2 million people in 
the nation’s prisons, plus countless more who are still under community 
custody or reeling from the effects of a guilty verdict.108 The United States’ 
criminal justice system produced a 500 percent increase in its incarcerated 
population in the last 30 years, despite evidence that incarceration is not the 
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108 Incarceration, THE SENTENCING PROJECT (Nov. 7, 2014), 
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best means to achieve public safety. 109  California’s policy emphasizes 
communication and education to reduce contact with the criminal justice 
system while adequately responding to sexual assault violations with the 
seriousness those violations deserve. 
Furthermore, college adjudicatory proceedings differ from criminal trials 
in another significant way. In a criminal trial, the state brings charges 
against the accused and defends its own interests; it does not advocate on 
behalf of the survivor. This procedure means that the needs of the survivor 
are secondary or ignored altogether. Schools are equipped to focus on the 
needs of the survivor, including academic accommodations, dorm and class 
transfers, and mental health support.110 Tantamount to all these benefits is 
the fact that schools are in a position to respond more quickly than our over-
burdened criminal justice system. 111  Attorney Nancy Chi Cantalupo, an 
expert on Title IX, spoke to this benefit: 
For student survivors of sexual assault, Title IX creates rights that 
do not exist in criminal law. The statute recognizes that students 
struggling to heal from sexual trauma often have greater difficulty 
succeeding in school. Sexual trauma commonly causes serious 
health consequences that lead to drops in grades, withdrawal from 
classes, transfers to less desirable schools and even dropping out. 
These consequences deny victims equal educational opportunity. 
In contrast, criminal laws cannot protect students from gender 
inequality and provide crime victims with few rights. Prosecutors 
do not represent victims, so victims have no right to confidentiality 
                                                                                                                     
109 Id. 
110 Why schools handle sexual violence reports, KNOW YOUR IX, 
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or privacy. Prosecutors’ wide discretion empowers them to 
shortchange victims’ interests for their own priorities.112 
The small percentage of men who rape, relative to the number of sexual 
assaults occurring on college campuses, lends further support to an 
affirmative consent standard. Critics of the affirmative consent standard 
worry that it will cause men to accidently rape more women, but the 
standard will likely give more women the framework to understand their 
experiences as reportable, 113 and theoretically allow those who are 
completing the majority of sexual assaults to be identified. 
C. How “No Means No” Fails Sexual Participants and “Yes Means Yes” 
Does Not  
Despite concerns regarding men’s inability to get affirmative consent, 
current standards relying on the subjective readings of ambiguous indicators 
of consent are far more dangerous for all people engaging in partnered sex. 
These criterions contribute to difficult standards of consent for women and 
also do no favors for men, who are the presumed initiators of sex. Under 
these standards, men learn that the absence of “no” operates as “yes.” 
Critics of SB 967 worry that the shift from “No Means No” to “Yes 
Means Yes” will cause the young men of America to accidently rape 
women and ruin their lives over a miscommunication during what was, to 
them, consensual sex. Laura Dunn, executive director of SurvJustice, 
describes how “No Means No” was a failed standard, causing more 
ambiguity than the affirmative consent standard: 
We only talked about what consent was not, which is not a very 
helpful paradigm. From the victim’s side, it says we have to resist. 
But even looking at this from the perspective of [the accused], the 
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traditional definition is telling them that it’s O.K. to do this until 
the victim says ‘no.’ That’s not really a helpful definition for them 
either because it can really be too late at that point. With 
affirmative consent, it’s simple. Consent is consent.114 
Conversely, under the traditional “No Means No” policies, the 
investigator would ask the complainant when she said no to sex, and if she 
failed to say no, then the investigator could assume the accused had no 
ability to know that the complainant was not interested in continuing with 
sexual activity. Under the new policy, rapists do not receive the license to 
presume consent when they have no reason to believe they received it.  
The bill makes clear that affirmative consent is not a requirement to 
engage in sexual activity, but a required lens through which allegations are 
evaluated. 115  Nothing in the statute prevents two or more people from 
agreeing to practice a different style of consent, but rapists ought to be wary 
that their failure to practice any consent will be scrutinized by the 
university’s misconduct board, as opposed to past procedures that 
scrutinized the complainant’s failure to say no. 
D. The Inherent Equity in Affirmative Policies 
This move promotes equity by changing the standards of consent to 
recognize the power imbalances that have been practiced throughout the 
history of rape law in the United States. We know that past practices—
where complainants are expected to voice non-consent through force and 
resistance—do not accurately reflect how most women respond to sexual 
assault.116 In the past, allegations of sexual assault could be set aside after 
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the accused showed that the complainant did not say “no.”117 Those legal 
standards inevitably promote rape by giving complainants the responsibility 
to prevent their own assaults, as opposed to placing the responsibility of 
positive and enthusiastic consent on all parties.  
Conversely, an affirmative consent standard asks all participants when 
they received consent, instead of asking the survivor how she resisted. 
Furthermore, the adoption of affirmative consent standards may encourage 
survivors to come forward because of the requirement that the accused 
show he sought and received consent. This change “straightforwardly 
eliminates a primary reason that sexual assault goes unreported: that the 
[survivor’s] credibility is questioned in the absence of visible cuts or 
bruises.” 118 Overall, the new standard promotes equity by abandoning 
offensive assumptions about how people express and receive consent.  
In Nicholas J. Little's law review article promoting the affirmative 
consent standard's adoption in criminal trials, he explains that the standard 
would only prevent silence from operating as consent.  He writes,  
 
Simply moving to an affirmative consent standard does not prevent 
the accused from claiming that he asked permission and the 
woman gave it to him. It is not, as some have suggested, a 
requirement that men carry permission slips that must be signed by 
the woman before sex. Instead, it holds that a man cannot take a 
woman's silence as indicative of a willingness to engage in sexual 
orientation.119  
 
In the case of university adjudicatory hearings, the university will still 
have to find that the complainant did not give consent, which includes 
verbal and non-verbal expressions of consent. 
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Arguments opposing affirmative consent standards fail because they rest 
on the criticism that privileging affirmative consent codifies an ambiguous 
standard that makes it difficult for men to know when they are raping 
someone and when they are having consensual and enthusiastic sex. This 
reasoning has two major flaws. First, it presumes that men are stupid and 
cannot tell the difference between rape and sex until their sex partner begins 
fighting for her life. This presumption is entirely offensive to all men. 
Second, the opposition to affirmative consent implies that a standard 
focusing on resistance and non-consent is less ambiguous. Because we 
know women respond to rape differently,120 a standard that seeks out a 
positive or affirmative expression of sexual enthusiasm is inherently less 
ambiguous. 
This clarity assists people engaging in sex understand what does and does 
not qualify as consent (e.g., “yes” means “yes,” while the absence of “yes” 
or another enthusiastic and positive expression of consent means “no”). 
Similarly, clearer lines will improve determinations of responsibility by 
preventing bias and gender stereotypes from predominating administrators’ 
decisions. The federal government’s promulgation of less ambiguous 
framework will help university administrators know when their 
investigations—or lack thereof—place them in violation of Title IX. A 
potential violation of Title IX, and the dependent suspension of federal 
funding, will likely prevent universities from engaging in silencing and 
inadequate investigatory behaviors and lead to more consistent and fair 
outcomes. 
Lastly, the growing precision of Title IX’s application to athletic 
programs suggests it will be equally successful in remedying problems 
related to sexual violence. To enforce the athletic nature of Title IX, 
Congress passed the Javits Amendment, which required the Department of 
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Health, Education, and Welfare to prepare “proposed regulations 
implementing the provisions of [Title IX] relating to the prohibition of sex 
discrimination in federally assisted education programs which shall include 
. . . reasonable provisions considering the nature of particular sports.”121 
Several guidance letters and the Civil Rights Restoration Act made it clear 
that “Title IX compliance is institution-wide, which means it is not focused 
on only a specific program or activity that receives federal financial 
assistance.”122 The success of Title IX in making intercollegiate athletics 
more equitable among sexes shows how clarification and scope of federal 
enforcement can create national and lasting changes to an institution. 
VII. ADDRESSING DUE PROCESS AND STANDARDS OF PROOF 
CONCERNS 
Reading the criticisms of affirmative consent policies can be frustrating 
because many of the writers misunderstand the policy to be one that 
legislates sexual behavior; however, many critics have been smart to 
recognize the potential due process concerns alive in this debate. This 
section will walk through the due process concerns and focus specifically 
on standards of proof the accused must meet. 
A. A General Overview of Due Process in Education 
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, primary 
and secondary public school students have both a property and liberty 
interest in their education.123 The Supreme Court held in Goss v. Lopez that 
                                                                                                                     
121 An Act To Extend and Amend the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 
and for Other Purposes, PL 93–380 (HR 69), PL 93–380, 88 Stat. 484 (1974). 
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344 (2012). 
123 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 577 (1975). At a minimum, students facing disciplinary 
action, such as a suspension, must be given “some kind of notice and afforded some kind 
of hearing.” Id. 
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public school students from kindergarten through high school face the 
deprivation of a liberty interest during school disciplinary proceedings and 
hearings because those findings could damage their reputations among 
peers, teachers, and future employers.124 However, it is not clear whether 
this holding translates to public universities and colleges, where students’ 
attendance is not mandatory, nor are they entitled to admission. 
Some lower courts have extended Goss’ protections to students of public 
colleges and universities.125 In Gaspar v. Burton, for example, a nursing 
student brought an action for wrongful dismissal following a determination 
of poor academic performance at a public vocational-technical college.126 
The Tenth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals found that the 
plaintiff had a property interest in her education after paying a “specific, 
separate fee for enrollment and attendance.”127 The court deferred to the 
university’s judgment because academic proceedings exercise a quasi-
judicial function and, therefore, “their decisions are conclusive, providing 
that their action has been in good faith and not arbitrary.”128 The court held 
further that schools only need to make the student aware prior to 
termination of that student’s “failure or impending failure to meet [the 
school’s academic] standards” to satisfy due process.129  The holding in 
Gaspar suggests that universities have broad discretion to remove students 
                                                                                                                     
124 Id. at 574–75. 
125 See Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 1988) (“not questioned that a 
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for subjective cause; however, the criminal nature of sexual assault 
allegations complicates this dynamic because of the stigma associated with 
a finding of responsibility. 
B. Stigma and Fair Standards of Proof 
Given the inherent stigma of criminal behavior, some courts mandate a 
higher standard of review for campus violations that are also criminal 
violations. For example, in Smyth v. Lubbers, students were suspended from 
their state university after a college official found marijuana in their dorm 
room.130 The students argued that the search was unlawful, that it violated 
their Fourth Amendment rights of privacy, and that the disciplinary 
proceeding’s “substantial evidence” standard of proof violated their due 
process rights.131 The district court held that, where a student is charged 
under college regulations with an act that is also criminal, “substantial 
evidence” is an inadequate standard of proof and that “any standard lower 
than a ‘preponderance of the evidence’ would have the effect of requiring 
the accused to prove his innocence . . . it would be fundamentally unfair to 
shift the burden of proof to the accused.” 132  The court encouraged 
universities to at least adopt a preponderance standard in future 
determinations because of the serious consequences of allegations that are 
also criminal.133 This holding, in some measure, supports the contention that 
the preponderance of the evidence standard would not shift the burden of 
proof to students who are accused of sexual assault, as many critics 
prophesize. 
The OCR mandated the preponderance standard through a “Dear 
Colleague Letter,” so even schools that have not instituted an affirmative 
                                                                                                                     
130 Smyth v. Lubber, 389 F. Supp. 777, 781 (W. D. Mich. 1975). 
131 Id. 
132 Id.  
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consent policy are still required to make determinations under the 
standard.134 In response to the letter’s policy, Lavinia M. Weizel applied the 
Supreme Court’s procedural due process balancing test from Mathews v. 
Eldridge to determine whether the preponderance standard jeopardizes the 
rights of accused students.135 Matthews held that due process is a flexible 
standard to be construed based on the demands of a particular situation.136 
In Matthews, the majority opinion held that due process generally 
requires the consideration of three distinct factors:  
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of 
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the 
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 
procedural requirement would entail.137 
As to the first factor, the property interest in one’s education and the 
liberty interest in one’s reputation are the private interests affected by 
university misconduct proceedings, specifically as they relate to future 
educational and employment opportunities.138 For the second, no data on 
false findings of responsibility under a preponderance standard exists, but 
plenty of solutions exist to safeguard against this risk. These solutions 
include the right to counsel; the right to cross-examine the witnesses against 
the accused; the right to a public hearing; a list of the witnesses the 
university intends to call; and recusal of hearing committee members with 
                                                                                                                     
134 ALI, supra note 49, at 10–11. 
135 Lavina M. Weizel, Note: The Process That Is Due: Preponderance of The Evidence as 
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Complaints, 53 B.C. L REV. 1613, 1625 (2012); see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
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familiarity with the accused, the complainant, or the conduct involved.139 
Neither the preponderance of the evidence standard nor an affirmative 
consent standard deny the student any of the above protections, as they are 
still available for any university to adopt under Title IX’s guidelines. 
The third factor is the government’s interest or the school’s interest. 
Universities have a massive interest in creating disciplinary proceedings 
that are fair to both parties because of the high rate of sexual assault and the 
difficulty complainants and survivors have in gaining a resolution that 
ensures the equal educational atmosphere Title IX guarantees.140 American 
rape law’s influence on the public’s willingness to disbelieve the 
complainant is the primary complication of the preponderance of the 
evidence standard, and is something that the affirmative consent standard 
will need to confront. 
Will Creely, writing for FIRE, worries that the preponderance standard 
will afford the accused “the scant protection of our judiciary’s least certain 
standard . . . [where] the burden of proof can be satisfied by little more than 
a hunch.”141 Creely’s premises his position on the idea that allegations of 
rape within college campuses are stigmatized, treated, and viewed with 
equal footing to those in criminal settings, but anecdotes from rape 
survivors suggest that this assumption is bore more out of hysteria than 
reality.142 Even before OCR mandated the preponderance standard, more 
than 80 percent of schools had already adopted it voluntarily.143 The use of 
                                                                                                                     
139 Weizel, supra note 135, at 1624. 
140 See id. at 1644. 
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a preponderance standard, without more survivor-centered policies like an 
affirmative consent standard and bystander trainings, do little to protect 
survivors of sexual assault. 
Joe Cohn, the legislative policy director of FIRE, argues that the adoption 
of affirmative consent standards will “undermine trust and the integrity and 
reliability of campus judiciaries.”144  But stories like Emma Sulkowicz’s 
show that, before affirmative consent was even a national hot topic, students 
were unable to trust in their campus disciplinary hearings.145  
C. Should Survivors Have Due Process Rights? 
The narrative that promotes disbelieving complainants in favor of 
protecting the accused’s future invalidates the survivors’ experiences, which 
often consists of a negative impact to their reputation and educational and 
future employment opportunities. 146  Despite consistent findings that the 
lack of institutional support following a sexual assault causes students to 
miss or fail classes, complainants have no due process rights in these 
proceedings. 
A student challenged her university’s violation of her due process rights 
in Theriault v. University of Southern Maine, where the faulty disciplinary 
proceeding against her alleged assailant caused harm to her education and 
emotional well-being.147 The court found that her  
property interest in a public education was not at issue in the 
Committee hearing and any alleged loss of educational opportunity 
was due to her subjective response to the outcome of the hearing, 
                                                                                                                     
144 Natalie Kitroeff, More States Tell College Students to Say Yes Before Sex, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. WEEK (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-
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the ‘attendant emotional anguish’ . . . was not imposed by any of 
the defendants, nor could it have been.148  
This case is used to support the conclusion that college misconduct hearings 
do not affect complainants’ liberty and property interests.  
Theriault states that a charge concerning a complainant’s reputation 
following a disciplinary hearing would need to implicate an underlying 
interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, like the vested property 
interest discussed in Gaspar.149 For students who experience sexual assault, 
the damage to their reputation does not give rise to a claim without a 
university action infringing on their interest in education, since the 
university does not pursue their expulsion or suspension following an 
allegation. 
This nuance concerning action and inaction is primarily semantic. 
Although the adjudicatory board does not decide to push the complainant 
out of school, suspend her from classes, or subject her to public humiliation 
following its determination, those consequences follow directly from a 
culture that fails to hold men accountable for sexual assault on college 
campuses. A campus culture that sustains and perpetuates a victim-blaming 
mentality delivers an inadvertent response to the complainant following an 
adjudicatory hearing that forces many of the proposed sanctions and 
punishments available to the accused onto the complainant. This dynamic is 
concerning because the inadvertency of these sanctions allows campus 
administrators to view the treatment as self-imposed. 
The standards used to decide these issues cannot be found in 
administrative and misconduct polices—they are the result of a culture that 
is willing to excuse rapists because of miscommunication, a culture of binge 
drinking, or the distractions of pretty girls. Though largely a cultural issue, 
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these assumptions and stereotypes have been codified and perpetuated 
through American rape law for years and now inform college adjudicatory 
proceedings. Stories like Emma Sulkowicz’s support the need for national 
affirmative consent policy because university sexual misconduct policies do 
not just need a few revisions, they need a complete overhaul to adequately 
respond to the problem. Affirmative consent policies make this shift 
possible. 
D. When to Share the Risk of Error 
Given the harms to both the accused and the accuser’s reputation, 
educational opportunities, and success following sexual assault, the 
preponderance of the evidence standard is the most equitable standard of 
proof. The lower standard is further supported by the fact that complainants 
are not guaranteed any due process should they experience injury to either 
liberty or property interests related to their educations. 
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Addington v. Texas, 
discussed the differences between the preponderance of the evidence and 
clear and convincing standards in a way that is helpful for settling this 
debate. 150  Addington decided the standard of proof necessary for the 
involuntary commitment of individuals with mental illness.151 The Court 
found that the individual’s liberty interest in the outcome of a civil 
commitment hearing was much greater than the state’s interest in providing 
care to its citizens who are unable to care for themselves and in protecting 
the community from those individuals with violent tendencies.152 The Court 
said that the “standard serves to allocate the risk of error between the 
litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate 
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decision.”153 The use of a preponderance of the evidence standard allows 
litigants to “share the risk of error in roughly equal fashion,” which is an 
inappropriate standard when deciding whether to commit an individual with 
mental illness against his will.154 
Universities further their interests in student safety and gender equality in 
educational access by using a preponderance of the evidence standard. 
Though, by its very nature, it could increase the risk of erroneous 
determinations, using the standard sends the message to the student body 
that the university is serious about supporting those who are sexually 
assaulted and holding accountable those who perpetuate those assaults. A 
policy using a “clear and convincing evidence” sets too high a standard 
based on the minimal risk to the accused’s freedom. 
The clear and convincing evidence standard is used in involuntary civil 
commitment cases, permanent termination of parental rights proceedings, 
and denaturalization determinations. 155  In all of these determinations, 
individuals are at risk of losing their freedom, their ability to parent their 
children, or the right to remain in the United States, respectively. Surely 
those losses are not comparable to a punishment that requires an individual 
to take Biology 101 next semester so as to avoid the woman he raped. 
Because universities so rarely impose suspensions after misconduct 
hearings, it is more helpful to compare determinations that currently use the 
“clear and convincing evidence” standard with more commonly used 
punishments, such as no-contact orders and sexual assault bystander 
trainings. 156  Taking actually imposed punishments into account further 
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illustrates how absurd the use of the clear and convincing evidence standard 
would be in college adjudicatory hearings. 
While the preponderance of the evidence standard does not shift the 
burden of proof to the accused, many argue that coupling it with the 
affirmative consent standard will unfairly shift the burden of proof. 
However, in sexual assault proceedings, it is the accused who raises consent 
as a defense. 157  In criminal proceedings, the defense that the sex was 
consensual is the most difficult defense for prosecutors to defeat.158 When a 
complaint is brought, the accused will raise consent as a defense and argue 
that he, in fact, had consensual sex with the complainant.  
The affirmative consent standard merely asks the accused to describe 
when he received consent at each point of the sexual encounter. This way, 
the complainant’s non-consent does not become the focus of the 
determination. 159  This definition of consent dissuades decision-making 
bodies from using the resistance and implied consent standards that have 
privileged rapists in the past. Additionally, it requires individuals to ensure 
an express agreement through words or actions before engaging in sexual 
contact, which raises the standard of sexual responsibility for all 
participants.160 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The topic of sexual assault, especially when the needs of perpetrators 
become tantamount to those of the survivors on college campuses, is a 
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depressing and tiresome topic. On the bright side, affirmative consent 
policies have really taken off since California passed SB 967. California 
already extended its “Yes Means Yes” policy to high school, and New York 
adopted an affirmative consent policy like California’s SB 967 in July. 161  
While defending the proposed bill in New Jersey, Democratic Senator 
Jim Beach said, “It will create a more supportive environment and get rid of 
the notion that victims must have verbally protested or physically resisted in 
order to have suffered from a sexual assault.” 162  Beach’s statement 
highlights the standard’s potential cultural impact as the strongest reason for 
the language’s adoption, as opposed to making it easier to vilify rapists. 
Despite the fact that legislators adopt affirmative consent policies in an 
effort to create safer spaces for women on college campuses, the 
conversation always turns to men, as if they have been forgotten. What 
people really forget is how central men’s autonomy has been to previous 
strategies to prevent rape. Consider rape whistles. They are not made for 
men to blow right before they consider raping someone; they are for women 
to use to notify people in the area that she is in danger. They are an example 
of how we have made it women’s responsibility to avoid rape. This 
approach does not work. 
In looking at college campuses, many blame the excessive number of 
sexual assaults on binge drinking. Jaclyn Friedman, the creator of the “Yes 
Means Yes” mantra, points out that the “unregulated party scene” is only a 
risk for half the population; being a woman is a risk factor for rape.163 The 
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problem is not drinking too much, short skirts, or fraternities—the problem 
is sexual misconduct policies that make the complainant’s consent suspect. 
Institutions of higher education, however, do not have stare decisis 
keeping them from responding quickly, appropriately, and intelligently to 
the sexual assault of women across the United States, and the federal 
government can accelerate the adoption of these policies through Title IX. 
The argument that affirmative consent standards will turn good men into 
rapists should offend all people, but particularly those who identify as men. 
In defending men from offensive rape narratives, Jill Filipovic writes, “Men 
are rational human beings fully capable of listening to their partners and 
understanding that sex isn’t about pushing someone to do something they 
don’t want to do. Plenty of men are able to grasp the idea that sex should be 
entered into joyfully and enthusiastically by both partners.”164 Affirmative 
consent is not scary. It is a necessary step our communities should welcome 
as we respond to years of allowing the absence of “no” to function as “yes.” 
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